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869 
A HOME FOR THE ROMA: WHY STRICT 
ENFORCEMENT OF MIGRATION LAWS IS 
NECESSARY FOR A UNITED EU 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade, two changes have fundamentally altered the 
otherwise cooperative nature of the European Union (“EU”): the 
admission of new member states
1
 and the subsequent high levels of 
migration by citizens from the new member states to the established 
member states.
2
 The demography of the EU has changed quickly in recent 
years, and the changes have sparked debates about how a larger, more 
mobile, and more multicultural EU will affect the cultures and economies 
of individual member states.
3
 
 
 
 1. Enlargement: From 6 to 27 Members, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/ 
from-6-to-27-members/index_en.htm (last visited May 23, 2012). 
 2. Communication from the Commission: Policy Plan on Legal Migration, at 3–4, COM (2005) 
669 final (Dec. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Communication from the Commission], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM: 2005:0669:FIN:EN:PDF (“Given the evolving 
EU economic and social situation, the international context and the likely growth of immigration in the 
future, an agreement on common EU rules covering the broad spectrum of migration issues is 
necessary in order to ensure an efficient management of migration flows both toward and inside 
Europe . . . .”). Although the EU lacks or withheld publication of data on aggregate immigration to the 
EU from non-EU nations, a sampling of the immigration data from individual countries demonstrates a 
clear increase. Many EU nations saw increases in the number of foreign immigrants between 1998 and 
2008, according to the most recent data published. Immigration by Sex, Age Group and Citizenship, 
EUROSTAT, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_imm1ctz&lang=en. For 
example, foreign immigration to Austria rose roughly 70%; Spain had fewer than 100,000 foreign 
immigrants in 1998, but over 900,000 in 2007 and nearly 700,000 in 2008; immigration to Greece 
increased over six-fold. Id. A few nations showed stable levels of foreign immigration or slight 
declines, but they still had high numbers of foreign-born citizens settling in their countries every year. 
Id. For example, Germany’s annual immigration slowly dipped from just above to just below 600,000 
foreign immigrants per year. Id. 
 3. As of July 2010, the EU contained approximately 500,000,000 people who speak 23 different 
official languages and over 60 regional languages, an increase from approximately 327,000,000 people 
in 2000. The World Factbook, European Union, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2011); Multilingualism, 
EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/ipg/content/multilingualism/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 
2011); Monica Marcu, Population and Social Conditions, EUROSTAT 1–2 (2009), available at http:// 
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-QA-09-031/EN/KS-QA-09-031-EN.PDF. Within 
the last decade, EU citizens have displayed hostility toward the high volume of largely unrestricted 
immigration by supporting extreme anti-immigration parties. See Stephen Castle, Swedish Anti-
Immigration Party Claims Seats, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/ 
20/world/europe/20sweden.html (discussing the success of Sweden’s center-right minister and 
similarly successful Danish and Norwegian anti-immigrant parties); Jurgen van de Pol, Dutch Put 
Anti-Immigration Party in EU Parliament, BLOOMBERG (June 5, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=arwd8D.6rQpQ (describing European citizens’ resistance to the 
admission of the newest EU member states). 
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The European Parliament recently enacted legislation that defines when 
and how countries may deport EU citizens while still complying with the 
EU’s right to freedom of movement.4 Because of the significant cultural, 
geographic, and economic differences among the member states, however, 
the wealthier, original EU members have significant incentives to shuffle 
minority populations to the newer, poorer EU member countries. Newer 
EU members are in the worst position to remedy the problems of minority 
integration and economic development, but as a result of weak 
enforcement of EU policy, original member states will continue to pursue 
isolationist policies at the expense of both newer EU members and the 
Union-wide goals to which all member states are bound.
5
 Therefore, the 
EU’s success in fostering international cooperation will partly depend on 
nations’ reactions when they have an incentive to act against the 
community interests of the EU. Where a member state has the incentive to 
subvert the EU’s freedom of movement laws and acts on that incentive,6 
the result will be an erosion of the EU’s collaborative ethic.7 
This Note will examine the responsibilities that EU law places on 
member states regarding migration management, discuss the European 
Commission’s power and willingness to enforce those laws, and consider 
 
 
 4. See Council Directive 2008/115, 2008 O.J. (L 115) 98 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:348:0098:0107:EN:pdf. 
 5. Treaty on European Union art. B, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html (“The Union shall set itself the following 
objectives: to promote economic and social progress . . . to assert its identity . . . . [T]he objectives of 
the Union shall be achieved as provided in this Treaty . . . .”). 
 6. See The Schengen Area and Cooperation, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/ju 
stice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33020_en.htm (last updated 
Mar. 8 2009) (“[A]ll countries cooperating in Schengen are not parties to the Schengen area. This is 
either because they do not wish to eliminate border controls or because they do not yet fulfill the 
required conditions for the application of the Schengen acquis.”). 
 7. Surveys of EU citizens show a decline in preference for unity over nationalism. The 
European Social Fund (ESF) is a program that “seeks to reduce differences in prosperity across the EU 
and enhance economic and social cohesion.” About ESF, EUR. SOC. FUND, http://www.dwp.gov.uk/ 
esf/about-esf/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2011). Recent research of EU citizens surveying their preferences for 
the goals of ESF shows that over twice as many citizens believe that the European Union should 
prioritize issues regarding crime (27%), as opposed to the 11% who believe that the EU should first 
address integration of minorities. Special Eurobarometer 350, EUR. SOC. FUND 5 (Nov. 2010), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_350_en.pdf. Countries with high 
levels of immigration tend to have the highest proportions of the populations viewing crime as a 
priority (the Netherlands (42%) and the United Kingdom (40%), compared with Latvia (12%) and 
Poland (15%)). Id. See EUROSTAT, supra note 2 for immigration statistics. Data is not as clear on 
integration. The EU countries with the highest levels of immigration vary significantly in how strongly 
their populations prioritize minority integration, suggesting member states are sharply divided on their 
support of EU free migration values (Denmark and Sweden (27%), compared with the United 
Kingdom and Italy (11%)). Id. at 16. 
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incentives for states to implement them.
8
 Further, it will analyze the recent 
conflicts between the EU and particular member states in terms of human 
rights and migration policy, most notably France’s deportation of the 
Roma people.
9
 The principal question is whether France’s course of action 
is an aberration—the result of a nation concerned about a specific 
perceived internal problem—or instead a manifestation of a deeper desire 
among the original member states to reject social legislation by an EU 
over which they have decreasing control. 
I. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The EU currently includes 27 nations.
10
 Some have been members 
since the EU’s inception in the mid-twentieth century (such as Belgium, 
France and Italy); others were admitted as recently as 2004 (the Czech 
Republic and Hungary) and 2007 (Romania and Bulgaria).
11
 Nonetheless, 
some policymakers have feared the consequences of the Union’s 
overexpansion,
12
 in large part because the EU’s fundamental right to move 
freely limits how an individual state may control its borders.
13
 
Citizens of the EU are free to move among the member countries with 
only minimal oversight by the individual national governments, provided 
those countries are members of the Schengen area.
14
 The Schengen area 
 
 
 8. Significantly, this Note does not focus on the actual impact, positive or negative, of high 
migration flows for temporary work visas. Instead, it focuses on the perceived effect of cultural 
integration and the result on citizens’ support for the European Union as a political institution.  
 9. See France Starts Removing Roma Camps, UKWIREDNEWS (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.uk 
wirednews.com/news.php/80223-France-starts-removing-Roma-camps. 
 10. Countries, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/member-countries/index_en.htm (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2011). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See MADELEINE SUMPTION & WILL SOMERVILLE, THE UK’S NEW EUROPEANS: PROGRESS 
AND CHALLENGES FIVE YEARS AFTER ACCESSION, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE 9 (2009), available 
at http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/new_europeans.pdf (discussing problems and 
future risks associated with EU expansion and increased migration); Enlargement, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/pol/en larg/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2011) (“The experience of previous EU 
enlargements has shown how well the EU integration process works . . . [but in light of concerns] EU 
leaders agreed in June 2006 that future enlargements will take into account the Union’s capacity to 
absorb new members.”). 
 13. Commission Adopts Revised Mechanism for Verifying the Application of Schengen Rules in 
the Member States, EUROPA (Mar. 5, 2009), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-359_en.htm?lo 
cale=en (“The Schengen area is based on full mutual trust between the Member States in their capacity 
to fully implement the accompanying measures which allow the lifting of internal border controls: e.g. 
checks at external borders are carried out by Member States not only to protect their own interests but 
also on behalf of all other Member States to which people could travel once they have crossed the 
external borders of the Schengen area.”). 
 14. See The Schengen Area and Cooperation, supra note 6. See also Council Directive 2004/38, 
2004 O.J. (L 158) 77, 78 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
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includes all of the EU except for the United Kingdom, Ireland, and new 
member states whose Schengen status has not yet been verified, including 
Bulgaria and Romania.
15
 The right to move freely is one of the core values 
of the EU,
16
 and absent extenuating circumstances, EU citizens are 
permitted entry into a host country for up to three months.
17
  
There are few instances in which the European Parliament indicates 
that it is appropriate for a nation to abridge the right to freedom of 
movement. The decision to expel an EU citizen from a country may only 
be made when it is “justified on the grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health.”18 The European Court of Justice held that 
differences in culture or economic need are not reasons supported by EU 
law.
19
 Furthermore, member states do not have broad discretion to expel 
groups of EU citizens within the parameters of the permitted motivations; 
rather, nations must consider a variety of factors while making an 
individualized decision.
20
 These factors include the “degree of integration 
of the persons concerned, the length of their residence in the host Member 
State, their age, state of health, family and economic situation and the 
 
 
OJ:L:2004:158:0077:0123:en:PDF (“Citizenship of the Union confers on every citizen of the Union a 
primary and individual right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 
subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaty and to the measures adopted to give it 
effect . . . . The free movement of persons constitutes one of the fundamental freedoms of the internal 
market, which comprises an area without internal frontiers, in which freedom is ensured in accordance 
with the provisions of the Treaty.”). 
 15. The Schengen Area and Cooperation, supra note 6. The Schengen area also includes several 
non-member states. Id. (“The precondition for association with the Schengen acquis by non-EU 
countries is an agreement on free movement of persons between those states and the EU . . . .”). 
 16. Council Directive 2004/38, supra note 14, at 82. (“Enjoyment of permanent residence by 
Union citizens who have chosen to settle long term in the host Member State would strengthen the 
feeling of Union citizenship and is a key element in promoting social cohesion, which is one of the 
fundamental objectives of the Union.”) (emphasis added). Nonetheless, the rapid expansion of the EU 
has led to greater disagreement between the original member states and new entrants about the wide 
liberties permitted to new entrants under the Schengen agreement. See, e.g., Juergen Baetz, Germany, 
France Warn of Swift Schengen Expansion, ASSOC. PRESS (Dec. 21, 2010), available at http:// 
www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=1466898&lang=tc_news&cate_img=1037.jpg&ca
te_rss=General. 
 17. Council Directive 2004/38, supra note 14, at 80. (“Union citizens should have the right of 
residence in the host Member State for a period not exceeding three months without being subject to 
any conditions or any formalities other than the requirement to hold a valid identity card or passport.”). 
 18. Id. at 84. While the standard for expulsion under this test may seem to be a significant burden 
for governments to meet, some authors consider any legislation permitting the expulsion of migrants to 
be a major shift in EU policy towards more limited migration rights. See, e.g., Abbey C. Furlong, 
Note, Cultural Integration in The European Union: A Comparative Analysis of the Immigration 
Policies of France and Spain, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 681, 696 (2010) (arguing that 
the inclusion of expulsion terms is an example of the EU taking a “hard line” on immigration). 
 19. Liav Orgad, Illiberal Liberalism: Cultural Restrictions on Migration and Access to 
Citizenship in Europe, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 53, 83 (2010). 
 20. See Council Directive 2004/38, supra note 14, at 84. 
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links with their country of origin.”21 Moreover, “[t]he personal conduct of 
the [expelled EU citizen] must represent a genuine, present and 
sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of 
society.”22 Individuals who meet the criteria for expulsion must also be 
given the opportunity to appeal the decision within the expelling country.
23
 
In addition to limiting the abilities of member states to abrogate 
freedom of movement, the EU requires that member states uphold certain 
human rights standards.
24
 On April 29, 2004, the European Parliament 
passed Directive 2004/38/ec (the “Directive”), which outlines the right of 
EU citizens to move freely among EU member states.
25
 The Directive 
prohibits countries from expelling citizens solely because of previous 
criminal convictions
26
 and explicitly prohibits discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality.
27
 While the Directive allows for significant state 
 
 
 21. Id. Moreover, general justifications not based on particularized facts, instead “rely[ing] on 
considerations of general prevention” are unacceptable reasons for expulsion. Id. art. 27.  
 22. Id. The EU’s interest in cohesive migration policy is also evident in its concern regarding 
immigration into the EU, believing that the “admission of third-country nationals [citizens of non-EU 
nations] in one Member State may affect others . . . .” Communication from the Commission, supra 
note 2, at 4. Even though admissions decisions for applicants seeking to enter the EU for work are 
subject to the discretion of individual nations, the EU emphasizes that the nations “must also take into 
account the Community preference principle” when making determinations. Id.  
 23. Council Directive 2004/38, supra note 14, art. 31. 
 24. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/Convention_ 
ENG.pdf. Under the Convention, member states carrying out arrests are required to inform the arrestee 
(in the arrestee’s language) of the reasons for the arrest and of any charges against him and to bring the 
arrestee promptly before a judge, in addition to other procedural safeguards. Id. § 1, art. 5. Countries in 
violation of these procedures are subject to suit for compensation by the victims of unlawful arrest. Id. 
§ 1, art. 6.  
 25. See Council Directive 2004/38, supra note 14, at 79. “[D]irectives specify substantive goals 
that must be attained by countries but leave the means of reaching those goals to the discretion of 
nations themselves.” Jeffrey Oliver Newton, Note, Taking the Nation out of International Law Reform: 
Considering a Purely Academic International Law Institute, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 609, 642 
(2009).  
 26. Council Directive 2004/38, supra note 14, art. 27. 
 27. Id. at 83. The right to move freely within member states is permitted “irrespective of 
nationality.” Id. at 79. It is the responsibility of the European Commission to ensure that nations 
correctly implement the Directive within their individual governance structures. See Governance 
Statement of the European Commission, at 2 (May 30, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/ 
synthesis/doc/governance_statement_en.pdf (“[The] European Commission . . . present[s] proposals 
for European law [and oversees] the correct implementation of the Treaties and European law . . . .”). 
EU legislation on immigration policy addresses the powers retained by nations (the right of nations to 
“determine volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their 
territory in order to seek work,” among other rights) more fully than it addresses the implications of a 
nation’s failure to implement EU law (limiting discussion to the EU’s general power to “give effect to” 
the migration laws). See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 79, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:EN:PDF. As a precursor to the Directive, 
compare the unadopted Proposal for a Council Directive on the Conditions of Entry and Residence of 
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autonomy to determine expulsion cases, all state laws affecting the 
decision must grant migrants at least as many liberties as those set out in 
the Directive.
28
 The deliberately narrow circumstances in which a state 
may limit an EU citizen’s freedom of movement emphasize that the ability 
of individual states to exclude certain groups from residence conflicts with 
the Union’s stated goal of producing “social cohesion.”29 
While the EU has removed many barriers to movement within the 
Union, the nations nonetheless remain autonomous, and the structure of 
the EU strongly prioritizes national independence.
30
 As such, when the 
European Parliament passes legislation, member states are responsible for 
enacting the laws within their own countries.
31
 The European Commission 
 
 
Third-Country Nationals for the Purpose of Paid Employment and Self-Employed Economic Activities, 
at 2, COM (2001) 386 final (Nov. 7, 2001), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri 
Serv.do?uri=COM:2001:0386:FIN:EN:PDF. The proposed directive sought “[t]ransparency and 
rationality” and “[c]lear and simple procedures,” presumably for the benefit of migrant workers, while 
still promising to “[r]espect . . . the domestic labor market situation.” Id.  
 28. Council Directive 2004/38, supra note 14, art. 37 (“The provisions of this Directive shall not 
affect any laws, regulations or administrative provisions laid down by a Member State which would be 
more favourable to the persons covered by this Directive.”). If protections for EU-citizen migrants are 
binding on member states, policies regarding non-EU citizens will also be significantly more binding. 
In cases involving refugees or other third-party nationals, the EU stringently enforces its protective 
migration laws. For example, if a nation is found to be in violation of proper immigration procedure 
for reasons such as failure to give meaningful notice to deportees, the European Court of Human 
Rights may award compensation to aliens who did not receive proper process. See Čonka v. Belgium, 
3 Eur. Ct. H.R. 91 (2002). In Conka, applicants for asylum were Slovakian nationals of Roma origin 
who requested political asylum on the grounds that they had been violently assaulted in Slovakia. Id. at 
95. Their application was denied. Id. Belgian police sent notice to the applicants and other Slovakian 
families to meet at the police station to complete their applications for refugee status. Id. Once there, 
police served the families with notices of detention and orders to leave Belgium. Id. at 96. The 
European Court of Human Rights found that Belgium was in violation of the Convention for the 
Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Id. at 97–99.  
 29. See Council Directive 2004/38, supra note 14, at 82 (“[S]ocial cohesion . . . is one of the 
fundamental objectives of the Union.”). 
 30. Treaty on European Union, supra note 5 (The EU is premised on nations “desiring to deepen 
the solidarity between [nations’] peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their 
traditions.”). 
 31. Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union art. 260, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 1 [hereinafter Treaties], available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/fxac08115enc_002.pdf.  
If the Court of Justice of the European Union finds that a Member State has failed to fulfil 
[sic] an obligation under the Treaties, the State shall be required to take the necessary 
measures to comply with the judgment of the Court. 
 If the Commission considers that the Member State concerned has not taken the 
necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court, it may bring the case before 
the Court after giving that State the opportunity to submit its observations . . .  
 If the Court finds that the Member State concerned has not complied with its judgment it 
may impose a lump sum or penalty payment on it . . .  
 . . . .  
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oversees the implementation of these laws and has the authority to bring 
nations to the Court of Justice if the member states fail to enact EU 
legislation.
32
 
II. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AMONG MEMBER STATES 
The expanded Union must consider its wide array of cultures and 
interests when forming migration policy. Surveys of the citizens of EU 
member nations generally show strongly divergent viewpoints on 
migration and cultural integration.
33
 As a result of disparate values 
regarding the treatment of migrants and integration of minorities, the 
expanded EU will continue to have difficulty creating migration policies 
acceptable to all member nations.
34
 
The recent development of mainstream anti-immigrant sentiment and 
support for anti-migration political parties in some European nations is a 
measurable indicator of the increasingly divided perspectives on EU 
migration policy.
35
 The Danish Peoples Party, based predominantly on 
 
 
 If the Court finds that there is an infringement it may impose a lump sum or penalty 
payment on the Member State concerned not exceeding the amount specified by the 
Commission. 
Id.  
 32. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Communities art. 9(D), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon], 
available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_lisbon_treaty.pdf (“[The Commission] shall 
oversee the application of Union law under the control of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union.”). 
 33. In opinion polls regarding various labor and employment issues in the European Union, 
populations gave widely disparate answers when asked to decide whether “integration of people 
excluded from society” was a priority. See Special Eurobarometer 350, supra note 7, at 23. Among 
original member states, percentages ranged from only 5% of the Irish population who supported 
prioritizing integration to 29% of the Swedish population. Most original member states’ percentages, 
however, fell in the mid to high teens. Id. Among newer members, percentages ranged from 2% of 
Latvians to 13% of Cypriots, with the mean around 10–15%. Id.  
 34. Though the EU legislation attempts to address communal goals and values, the opinions of 
citizens clearly show that national interests dominate. For an example of self-interested behavior, see 
Special Eurobarometer 350, supra note 7, at 25 (the percentage of a national population that believes 
ESF aid should go only to the poorest countries correlates with a nation’s wealth: the wealthiest 
nations have the lowest percentages of citizens who believe aid should go exclusively to poorer EU 
countries).  
 35. See Marko Valenta & Nihad Bunar, State Assisted Integration: Refugee Integration Policies 
in Scandinavian Welfare States: The Swedish and Norwegian Experience, 23 J. REFUGEE STUD. 463, 
470 (2010) (suggesting the rise of anti-immigrant parties affects national migration policy). Moreover, 
the percent of Spanish citizens who believed that “immigrants are a danger to [Spanish] culture and 
identity” increased by approximately 150% between 1999 and 2001. Furlong, supra note 18, at 686–87 
(noting that the percentage of respondents agreeing with the statement increased from 10.6% in 1999 
to 25.8% in 2001). Likewise, a 2002 poll showed that 77% of Spanish citizens surveyed “blamed 
immigrants for recent increases in the crime rate” in 2002. Id. at 687. In the Netherlands, “fifty-six 
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nationalism and seeking a high standard of assimilation for immigration, is 
the third-largest political party in Denmark.
36
 Similarly, the Front 
National, France’s right wing, anti-immigration party, has developed a 
sizeable faction of support.
37
 It is unsurprising, therefore, that nations have 
begun testing the bounds of the European Commission’s permissiveness 
when creating their own migration policies.  
III. THE ROMA CONFLICT 
France has become an archetype for the differing viewpoints on the 
extent to which EU member nations should be allowed to monitor and 
enforce residency within their borders, in significant part because France 
has experienced higher rates of immigration than many other member 
nations.
38
 France attracted public attention in 2010 for ordering the 
expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Roma and other migrants from the 
camps the migrants established in France after the expiration of their 
temporary visas.
39
 Some argue that a migrant’s attack on French police in 
July 2010 and the subsequent migrant riots against French police 
motivated France’s decisive action.40 Soon after, French President 
Nicholas Sarkozy ordered the “immediate expulsion of Bulgarian and 
Romanian Roma who have committed public order offences.”41 
The Roma are the largest minority group in Europe,
42
 and many are 
Romanian nationals.
43
 While some European nations seem to consider 
 
 
percent of the Dutch population sees Islam as a threat, and fifty-seven percent maintain that allowing 
migration was ‘the biggest mistake in Dutch history.’” Orgad, supra note 19, at 74. 
 36. Orgad, supra note 19, at 82.  
 37. See Yael Barbibay, Note, Citizenship Privilege or the Right to Religious Freedom: The 
Blackmailing of France’s Islamic Women, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 159, 172 (2010) (“[Front 
National] has received the support of a significant portion of French citizenry, receiving the votes of 
15% to 21% of the electorate in various elections.”). 
 38. In 2008, France received the fourth-highest number of immigrants of all European Union 
member states, with 183,220 new immigrants. Spain, Germany, and Italy were the other three 
countries with the highest numbers of immigrants. Data on Immigration by Sex, Age and Broad Group 
of Country of Birth, EUROSTAT, available at http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset= 
migr_imm4ctb&lang=en (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). 
 39. See France Starts Removing Roma Camps, supra note 9; see also France to Shut Illegal 
Roma Camps and Deport Migrants, BBC NEWS EUR. (July 29, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
world-europe-10798440. 
 40. See France Starts Removing Roma Camps, supra note 9.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Iskra Uzunova, Note, Roma Integration in Europe: Why Minority Rights Are Failing, 27 
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 283, 285 (2010). “The term Roma generally refers to persons who 
‘[describe] themselves as Roma, Gypsies, Travellers, Manouches, and Sinti . . . .’” Id. at 287. 
 43. Rupert Wolfe Murray, Romania’s Government Moves to Rename the Roma, TIME (Dec. 8, 
2010), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2035862,00.html. There are an estimated 1.5 
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Roma a threat to the national economy and public safety (either officially 
or impliedly, as interpreted from governmental actions), human rights 
organizations emphasize the depraved situation of many Roma, largely 
resulting from international discrimination.
44
 The EU particularly 
emphasizes the member nations’ special responsibility to prevent the 
widespread persecution, poverty, and unemployment of Roma people.
45
 
The problem of Roma development uniquely blends the need for state 
sovereignty to protect the nation’s autonomy and uphold its laws with the 
need for a transnational means of addressing widespread Roma poverty.  
French attitudes toward immigrants appear particularly ethnocentric, 
though whether the sentiment is a response to high levels of immigration 
or an inherent cultural characteristic that exacerbates migration issues is 
unclear. One summary of French attitudes toward migration argues that 
“immigrants should strive to accept and embrace traditional French values, 
particularly the language and the notion of secularism, while 
simultaneously abandoning (or, at the very least, relegating to the private 
sphere) any continued adherence to their original cultures, particularly 
with respect to religion.”46 France’s history of restrictive migration policy 
is intertwined with its long history of, and cultural perspective on, 
immigration.
47
 Despite France’s longtime EU membership, its cultural 
 
 
million Roma in Romania. Id. Roma integration has recently become a dominant concern in Europe 
because in 2007, Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU. See SUMPTION & SOMERVILLE, supra note 12, 
at 9. After Romania, Bulgaria and other Eastern European nations joined the Union, and the EU’s 
freedom of movement rights “led to a wave of immigration that was not only unprecedented, but 
highly unexpected.” Id.  
 44. “Roma have a lower life expectancy . . . higher infant mortality rate, live in substandard 
conditions . . . and, in many instances, do not have access to healthcare or education.” Uzunova, supra 
note 42, at 288. Data suggests that states’ fear of the economic impact of Roma people is not 
unfounded; “in 2006, 90 percent of all Roma in Bulgaria lived on state benefits.” Id. at 289. Moreover, 
“[u]nder Gypsy law, theft and fraud are crimes only when perpetrated against other Gypsies,” and 
“often do not comply with the laws of the host country and often violate the host country’s theft and 
fraud laws.” Id. at 295. Governmental wariness at the impact of large settlements of Roma is, 
therefore, somewhat rationally founded on the fear that Roma will not integrate with local 
communities or obey national laws. See id. at 305 (Bulgarians will support integration of Armenians, 
another minority group, but not Roma, because after coming to Bulgaria, Armenians “know perfect 
Bulgarian. They identify themselves as Bulgarian . . . . They are pleasant guests, who are part of 
Bulgarian society.”). 
 45. See EU and Roma, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/roma/index_en 
.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2012) (“The European institutions and EU countries have a joint 
responsibility to improve the social inclusion and integration of Roma by using all the respective 
instruments and policies for which they are responsible.”). 
 46. See Furlong, supra note 18, at 683.  
 47. Id.  
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values on migration issues differ markedly from the values emphasized by 
EU programs,
48
 resulting in power struggles like the Roma conflict.  
While the Roma conflict is a recent manifestation of anti-immigration 
backlash against the EU, the older member states previously expressed 
concern about the impact of masses of foreign EU citizens permanently 
residing in the wealthier, often homogenous countries.
49
 These countries 
have typically been concerned with economic issues—specifically, the 
rapid increase in the number of unskilled workers entering Western 
European countries in a short amount of time.
50
 If leaders of EU countries 
foresaw problems stemming from cultural clashes between nationals and 
migrants, they were less vocal about them; any concerns over cultural 
issues lacked the public attention that economic issues received.
51
 The rise 
of purportedly ethnic-based discrimination in residency status is, therefore, 
a new problem brought to the EU’s attention as a result of increased intra-
EU migration.
52
 
 
 
 48. Council Directive 2004/38, supra note 14, at 82 (the EU requires the host Member State to 
examine an extensive series of factors when considering migrant expulsion). See, e.g., European Social 
Fund, supra note 7.  
 49. See SUMPTION & SOMERVILLE, supra note 12.  
 50. See Roger J. Goebel, The European Union Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the 
Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1092, 1177–78 (1995). As Eastern 
European nations joined the original member states in the European Union, the original members 
feared that a “flood of unemployed workers” would “augment the problems of chronic high 
unemployment” within the Union. Natalie Shimmel, Welcome to Europe, but Please Stay Out: 
Freedom of Movement and the May 2004 Expansion of the European Union, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
760, 777 (2006). 
 51. Some information in this Note is based on arguments regarding non-EU citizen immigration 
and asylum policies. However, though the economic effect of employed non-EU migrants on a nation 
is likely different than the effect of refugees and unemployed EU migrants, the issues of cultural 
integration and conflict remain. See Communication From the Commission, supra note 2, at 4 (“An 
effective migration policy cannot be limited to instruments for the admission of immigrants . . . . 
Admission of economic immigrants is as inseparable from measures on integration on one hand, as it 
is from the fight against illegal immigration . . . .”). 
 52. President Sarkozy acknowledges the cultural nature of the conflict between France and the 
Roma and other traveling people. See Bruce Crumley, Anger as Sarkozy Targets Roma in Crime 
Crackdown, TIME (July 23, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2005818,00.html 
(suggesting the Roma’s “nomadic lifestyle” prevents “‘assimilation into [the] communities’ they live 
near”). France nonetheless denies that its actions to expel the Roma people are ethnically 
discriminatory, insisting instead that the government has directed its actions at specific public threats. 
Press Release, European Commission on Human Rights, European Commission Assesses Recent 
Developments in France, Discusses Overall Situation of the Roma and EU Law on Free Movement of 
EU Citizens (Sept. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Press Release], available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-10-1207_en.htm (“The Commission took note today of the assurances given by France at 
the highest political level on 22 September 2010 that . . . [m]easures taken by the French authorities 
since this summer did not have the objective or the effect of targeting a specific ethnic minority, but 
treated all EU citizens in the same manner.”). 
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The EU was skeptical that France’s decision to expel Roma people 
complied with EU legislation.
53
 As a result, it sought an explicit 
codification of the Directive into French national law with a hard deadline 
of October 15, 2010 before disciplinary actions against France would be 
taken.
54
 Other members of the EU community, through the European 
Roma Rights Centre, also expressed disapproval of France’s actions.55 
Despite apparent international disapproval of France’s alleged failure to 
comply with EU law, many other EU member nations have been no more 
welcoming to migrants.
56
 
France asserted that its decisions to expel Roma people were not based 
on ethnicity.
57
 France implemented the mechanisms to remove Roma, 
however, well before the July 2010 incidents occurred; in March 2010, the 
French legislature passed a bill that expedites the process of expelling non-
French EU citizens for “abusive occupation of land,” which critics argue 
unfairly targets Roma.
58
 Despite the EU’s purported interest in freedom of 
movement, it resisted taking a firm stance against France’s actions toward 
the Roma.
59
 Furthermore, upon France’s last-minute promise to amend its 
immigration laws, the European Commission suspended any disciplinary 
 
 
 53. Id. (“At this stage, the Commission considers that France has not yet transposed the Directive 
on Free Movement into national legislation that makes these rights fully effective and transparent. 
Therefore, the Commission decided today that it will issue a letter of formal notice to France 
requesting the full transposition of the directive, unless draft transposition measures and a detailed 
transposition schedule are provided . . . .”). 
 54. See id. The EU only looked into France’s failure to codify EU parliamentary law generally, 
and it did not charge France with violations of the Directive in the form of ethnic discrimination or 
expulsions based on prior convictions. Id. 
 55. The public interest group European Roma Rights Centre (“ERRC”) submitted a complaint to 
the European Commission, alleging that the expulsions were ethnically based because they targeted 
Roma and therefore violated the Directive. Submission from Robert Kushen, Executive Director, 
European Roma Rights Centre, to European Commission (Sept. 27, 2010), available at http://www 
.errc.org/cms/upload/file/france-ec-legalbrief-27-sept-2010.pdf. The ERRC also alleges that France 
failed to make individualized decisions regarding deportation, as required by the Directive. Id.  
 56. See generally Uzunova, supra note 42 (discussing discrimination of minorities in EU 
member states including migrants). In particular, Italy and Germany, two countries with higher annual 
immigration rates than France, have begun taking measures to limit immigration and unlawful 
residence. See Pallavi Aiyar, Brussels Takes on France over Roma, BUS. STANDARD (Oct. 1, 2010), 
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/brussels-takesfrance-over-roma/409834/ (Italy’s interior 
minister has announced plans to “make it easier to expel EU migrants with insufficient resources to 
support themselves.”); Germany Denies French Claim Over Roma Camps, BBC NEWS EUR. (Sept. 17, 
2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11345165 (Germany plans to return ten thousand 
Roma to Kosovo as well).  
 57. See Press Release, supra note 52.  
 58. French MPs Say Yes to Stripping Nationality Law, AL ARABIYA NEWS (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/09/30/120841.html. 
 59. EC Suspends Action Over France Roma Expulsions, DAILY TEL. (Oct. 19, 2010), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/8073216/EC-suspends-action-over-France-
Roma-expulsions.html. 
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action against France.
60
 While France met the EU’s deadline and proposed 
changes in its national policies to comport with EU law, it presented 
nothing more than a proposal, and the suspension of disciplinary action 
does not appear to be based on any requirement that the plans actually be 
administered.
61
 The EU’s hesitancy to take a firm stance has not gone 
unnoticed throughout Europe. One organization, characteristic of those 
critical of EU restraint in enforcing migration policy, called the European 
Commission’s dismissal an “extremely damaging . . . P.R. disaster, 
making the commission [sic] look weak and France look vindicated 
. . . .”62 The EU’s position on the level of autonomy granted to France 
while the EU navigates the increasingly prevalent issue of minority 
integration will set the tone for how proactively member states can protect 
their own interests without breaching EU laws designed to foster common 
immigration policies in the future. 
IV. ENFORCEMENT POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
When France, and similarly situated nations, set their own policies for 
Roma inclusion or exclusion in policy areas on which the European 
Parliament has explicitly legislated, they act against the communal 
intentions of the EU.
63
 While the EU has emphasized from its inception 
the importance of national sovereignty and the broad right of nations to 
govern their own affairs,
64
 EU law trumps national law in the case of a 
conflict.
65
 One cause of the apparent power struggle between member 
 
 
 60. Id. See also Matthew Saltmarsh, European Union Halts Action Against French on Expulsions 
of Roma, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/20/world/europe/20roma 
.html?scp=1&_r=0 (noting that France submitted its plans only an hour before the deadline after 
receiving the warning the prior month). 
 61. Constant Brand, Commission Drops Legal Threat Against France, EUR. VOICE (Oct. 19, 
2010), https://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2010/10/commission-drops-legal-threat-against-france/ 
69196.aspx. While France made “official commitments” to make changes in its immigration law, 
including ensuring that any expulsions are not “made on the basis of ethnicity or targeting specific 
groups” and assessing each expulsion “on a case-by case basis, taking into account social situation and 
age,” there was no mention of a date by which time the changes must have been enacted. Id. 
 62. See Saltmarsh, supra note 60. The Open Society Institute fears that other states will take the 
Commission’s failure to sanction France as complicity with its possibly discriminatory policies. Id. 
 63. See Treaty on European Union, supra note 5, at 4 (outlining the communal intentions of the 
EU). 
 64. See TFEU, supra note 27, art. 20 (“Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not 
replace national citizenship.”). 
 65. TFEU, supra note 27, art. 2.  
 When the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, only the 
Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so 
themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss4/5
  
 
 
 
 
2012] A HOME FOR THE ROMA 881 
 
 
 
 
states and the EU may be the somewhat ambiguous language of the EU 
law, referred to as the Functioning Treaty, which governs migration 
policy.
66
 The EU does not, in the Functioning Treaty, declare itself to have 
exclusive competence in migration policy.
67
 Rather, migration policy 
likely falls under member states’ and the EU’s “shared” competency under 
the “area of freedom, security and justice” subheading.68 The EU could 
argue, however, that migration policy is more properly categorized as 
“development and humanitarian aid,” in which case “the Union shall have 
competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy.”69 
Though the initial reading of the Functioning Treaty appears to grant the 
EU significant power, it includes the caveat that “the exercise of [the EU’s 
development and humanitarian aid] competence shall not result in Member 
States being prevented from exercising theirs,” thus preserving state 
autonomy.
70
 As such, while the Functioning Treaty neatly defines control 
of non-EU immigration as a common problem, it fails to specify exactly 
which aspects of intra-EU immigration policy the member countries may 
legislatively manage.
71
 
France is not the first nation whose policies arguably violate EU 
migration law.
72
 Nonetheless, as public clashes between the EU and 
member nations become more frequent, the Commission’s responses are 
subject to heightened critical review by the public. As the EU’s executive 
branch, the European Commission does not in and of itself have the power 
to discipline nations that fail to integrate EU law into their national laws.
73
 
Instead, the European Commission first issues a formal statement 
 
 
 When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in a 
specific area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts 
in that area. The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union 
has not exercised its competence. 
Id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. art. 67. 
 68. Id. art. 4. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. art. 67. 
 72. After the publication of the Directive, the Spanish foreign ministry stated it would “not 
change its immigration policy” and that the Directive would “not affect the country’s current laws.” 
Furlong, supra note 18, at 697.  
 73. For an outline of typical Commission procedure, see Riva Froymovich et al., 2nd Update: 
EU Investigates Discrimination In Hungary’s New Tax, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.retail-it.info/index.php?view=article&catid=2%3Agenerall&id=5287%3Aeu-investigates-
discrimination-in-hungarys-new-tax-&format=pdf&option=com_content&Itemid=2 (original source is 
no longer available).  
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describing the nation’s infringement of EU law.74 The nation then has an 
opportunity to amend its laws to comply with EU legislation.
75
 If the 
nation fails to do so, the Commission can bring the matter before the Court 
of Justice.
76
 
If the Commission does not bring an issue before the Court of Justice, 
it declines out of deference to national discretion on heated political 
issues, not because the Commission lacks the power to so act.
77
 This 
deference substantially degrades the Commission’s political credibility.78 
On less politically charged issues, the Court of Justice has frequently 
struck down the laws of member states after investigations and 
recommendations by the European Commission.
79
 The European 
Commission has been reticent, however, to act decisively when faced with 
highly political issues, especially those concerning migration or minority 
rights.
80
 Nonetheless, by pressuring member states to change national laws 
to comport with EU legislation, the European Commission has created the 
appearance of compliance with EU law.
81
 Merely assuming voluntary 
compliance is not a viable long-term strategy for enforcing migration 
policy, however, since the interests of individual states differ 
 
 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See, e.g., Saltmarsh, supra note 60.  
 79. See, e.g., Georgina Adam, Flavin and Viola Light Works Ruled “Not Art,” THE ART 
NEWSPAPER (Dec. 16, 2010), available at http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Flavin+and+ 
Viola+light+works+ruled+%E2%80%9Cnot+art%E2%80%9D/22069 (describing the European 
Commission’s decision defining what is and is not art for tax purposes); Sonya Angelica Diehn, Dutch 
Public Broadcasters in the Hole for $101M, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Dec. 20, 2010), 
http://www.courthousenews.com/2010/12/20/32736.htm (holding that Dutch broadcasters had been 
overcompensated).  
 80. The president of the European Commission explains the apparent contrast in the 
Commission’s actions, admitting, regarding a dispute over enforcement of media rights among the 
states, that “[t]here are the legal issues where we have to be extremely strict but there are also political 
considerations . . . .” Terri Schultz, Hungary’s Rocky First Week as EU President, GLOBALPOST (Jan. 
9, 2011), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/european-union/110108/hungary-eu-president-media-
law.  
 81. For example, in 2008, Italy enacted anti-Roma policies similar to those implemented in 2010 
in France. After a formal warning from the European Commission that Italy’s laws violated the 
Directive, Italy’s foreign minister assured the Commission that its policies would fully comply with 
EU law. Rome v. Roma, ECONOMIST (May 22, 2008), available at http://www.economist.com/node/ 
11412932?story_id=11412932. Italy’s promise of good faith appears to have been all the European 
Union sought; within months the EU cleared Italy of any charges of discrimination after the Italian 
government argued that the fingerprinting and other policies directed at Roma people were a necessary 
part of census-taking. Richard Owen, EU Clears Berlusconi Over Roma Gypsies, THE TIMES (Sept. 4, 
2008), available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article4674724.ece.  
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significantly.
82
 If the European Commission remains reluctant to indict 
member states for facially illegal national laws, it jeopardizes the EU’s 
permanent authority over the member states. 
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF SOFT ENFORCEMENT 
Despite any inherent cultural ethnocentricity, data on France’s 
migration policy and decision history indicates that France is consistent 
with the policies and decisions of original member states. In 2008 and 
2009, France made many more immigration decisions than other EU 
nations.
83
 Given the trend of anti-immigration policies in France, the high 
number of immigration decisions might suggest that France was 
particularly vigilant in rejecting applications for asylum. The percentage of 
asylum applicants accepted, however, was average compared to other 
European nations.
84
 This statistic suggests that France’s policies and 
 
 
 82. See About ESF, supra note 7. 
 83. Final Decisions on Applications by Citizenship, Age and Sex Annual Data, EUROSTAT, 
available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_details/dataset?p_product_ 
code=MIGR_ASYDCFINA (last visited Nov. 28, 2012). In 2008, France made the highest number of 
decisions on asylum applications (24,350), followed by the United Kingdom (13,915), and Sweden 
(11,130). Id. France also made the highest number of decisions in 2009 (19,565). Id.  
 84. Using the available asylum data as a proxy for openness towards accepting migrants 
generally, it is possible to calculate the percent of applicants accepted for asylum. Looking at the five 
EU member countries that made the most decisions regarding applications—France, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland—the total number of positive decisions was divided by 
the total number of decisions made. Figure 1 shows the results. See id. 
FIGURE 1: PERCENT OF ASYLUM APPLICATIONS ACCEPTED 
  2009 2008 
France 27% 26% 
Germany 34% 25% 
Sweden 13% 7% 
Switzerland 10% 12% 
United Kingdom 41% 36% 
Despite its average rate of asylum applicants accepted, France in 2010 was one of the countries that 
most frequently ordered non-EU citizens to leave, suggesting it more actively enforces residency laws 
than many of its EU neighbors. See Third Country Nationals Ordered to Leave, EUROSTAT, 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_eiord&lang=en (last visited Nov. 28, 
2010). In 2008, France ordered the second highest number of expulsions out of all Union nations for 
which data is available, with 97,515 orders. Id. In 2009, France ordered the third highest number of 
expulsions, ordering 88,565 third-country residents to leave. Id. In comparison, the United Kingdom 
ordered approximately 70,000 third-country nationals to leave in those years, and Germany ordered 
fewer than 15,000 third-country nationals to leave. Id. It is unclear from the data whether, because 
Romania and Bulgaria are not members of the Schengen area, Romanian and Bulgarian citizens were 
considered third-party nationals or EU citizens for purposes of expulsions.  
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attitudes towards migration reflect those of other original EU members.
85
 
France’s actions are, therefore, merely the most publicized example of a 
nation grappling to solve a very real problem within the parameters of EU 
approval, but without any substantive EU assistance.
86
 Given the data on 
the rise of anti-immigration parties throughout Europe,
87
 the international 
condemnation of France’s actions appears somewhat hypocritical. 
While the wealthiest countries in the European Union have seen the 
largest political backlash against high volumes of immigrants and 
migrants,
88
 they are not the only states affected by disparate enforcement 
of purportedly international migration policies.
89
 As internal barriers have 
fallen,
90
 border states have increasingly borne the burden of controlling the 
entry of non-E.U. citizens into the Schengen area.
91
 Though extra-Union 
immigration is governed by different laws and poses different issues than 
 
 
 85. Hosting Roma migrants poses unique challenges compared to hosting other immigrants, in 
part because of the insular Roma community. See Uzunova, supra note 42, at 294 (“Gypsy law has 
evolved to insulate Gypsies from the host society, and thus to maintain its own insularity from the host 
legal system . . . .”). Moreover, because Roma are a minority in Romania, they are not represented by 
general data on Romanian migrants. For example, information that Romanian migrants are generally 
more skilled and more employed than the average migrant would not apply to the Roma. SUMPTION & 
SOMERVILLE, supra note 12, at 20. Despite these differences, the immigration process as a whole is 
bound to incite tensions between migrant groups and their hosting communities. Sumption and 
Somerville argue that “some of the more keenly felt impacts of [Eastern European] migration have 
been social and cultural, rather than economic,” citing “misunderstandings about ‘laws, regulations 
and community expectations’” as frequent catalysts for conflict. Id. at 41.  
 86. While the EU sets standards for admission and deportation of intra-union migrants, it does 
not provide assistance to national governments to aid in the naturalization of migrants or extra-Union 
immigrants. See Council Directive 2004/38, supra note 14, art. 37 (implying extra-Union migration is 
an issue for States to regulate). In contrast, EU regulations on asylum procedures acknowledge that 
hosting a large volume of refugees places significant burdens on host countries. See generally Council 
Directive 2001/55, 2001 O.J. (L 212) 12 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex 
UriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:212:0012:0023:EN:PDF; see also Stanley Pignal, Migrant Crisis in Greece 
Strains EU Open Borders, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0a5616a8-
0c6b-11e0-8408-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DYRz1ZA6 (noting that the EU offered assistance for the 
first time to aid Greece in handling a large flux of refugees).  
 87. See, e.g., Castle, supra note 3 (“Sweden became the latest European nation to see [a rise in] 
anti-immigration.”). 
 88. See Valenta & Benar, supra note 35. 
 89. See Immigration, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/ 
immigration/index_en.htm (last updated Dec. 19, 2012) (discussing immigration issues in the EU as a 
whole). 
 90. See The Schengen Area and Cooperation, supra note 6 (“The Schengen area represents a 
territory where the free movement of persons is guaranteed.”).  
 91. See generally Nicholas De Blouw, Drowning Policies: A Proposal to Modify the Dublin 
Agreement and Reduce Human Rights Abuses in the Mediterranean, 40 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 335 
(2009). Malta and other southern European countries particularly feel the push of new immigrants 
from Africa upon their borders. Id. The EU’s regulations “place a disproportionate responsibility on 
southern Europe in the absence of a clear EU responsibility-sharing mechanism.” Id. at 347 (citations 
omitted). 
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EU citizen movement and residency, the EU’s failure to adequately share 
the burden of monitoring and distributing the costs of immigration among 
all member states can be felt by newer EU nations as well.
92
 
The probable consequence of failure to enforce EU-wide migration 
policies is a continued dissolution of international collaboration and 
minority integration.
93
 Furthermore, it appears that public distrust of 
immigrants is a common viewpoint in the EU. Indeed, even the Chancellor 
of Germany “endorsed claims that religious young men of Muslim origin 
are more likely to commit acts of violence than other young Germans.”94 
Discrimination against the Roma people, in particular, is a longstanding 
problem in Europe, and nationalist migration policies threaten to worsen 
the situation of the Roma. For example, in 2008, Italian officials began to 
record the fingerprints of thousands of Gypsies in Italy.
95
 Similar to its 
reaction in the French case, the EU Parliament urged Italy to cease 
collecting the fingerprints, suggesting the practice was ethnically 
discriminatory, but later backed away from its condemnation, tacitly 
permitting complete state sovereignty in migration issues.
96
 In light of this 
earlier Italian activity, France’s treatment of Roma people seems not an 
aberration; but rather, it is consistent with the autonomy the EU has 
impliedly granted nations to handle perceived migration issues. The 
European Parliament’s and the European Commission’s refusal to 
formally penalize nations expelling or documenting Roma has resulted in 
a cycle that ultimately erodes both Roma rights and EU authority: national 
governments enforce a national migration law; EU citizens contend that 
the laws constitute discrimination; the EU Parliament or Commission 
condemns the law, but ultimately files no formal indictment. As a result, 
nations are effectively determining their own migration policies 
unconstrained by the EU’s communal motives. 
 
 
 92. See generally id. 
 93. For example, in Germany where nearly one in five residents is an immigrant or the child of 
immigrant parents, many members of the public blame immigrants for social and criminal problems. 
David Frum, Germany’s Merkel Is Right—Multiculturalism Has Failed, CNN OP. (Oct. 18, 2010), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-18/opinion/frum.merkel.multicultural_1_germany-s-merkel-chancell 
or-merkel-angela-merkel?_s=PM:OPINION. As in the French case, the catalyst to anti-immigration 
sentiments in Germany began after two teenagers, one an immigrant and one the child of immigrant 
parents, assaulted a 76-year-old man. Id. This cultural clash began a wave of public opinion that 
resulted in much of the German public associating immigrants with crime and violence. See id.  
 94. Id.  
 95. Uzunova, supra note 42, at 283.  
 96. Id. at 284.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
886 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 11:869 
 
 
 
 
Member states’ treatment of Roma under their individual national 
policies varies significantly.
97
 Whether or not Roma inclusion and social 
aid are reasonable goals, it is clear that these goals will not be achieved 
unless the EU takes a strong transnational stance to improve the Roma 
situation.
98
 The EU is consistent in its official discourse about the need for 
Roma improvement and integration, but its lack of action presents an 
entirely different message to member states.
99
 
One possible, if simple, explanation is that the EU is overwhelmed by 
the economic and cultural challenges stemming from its new 
multiculturalism. The EU, like any institution, has limited economic and 
political capital; perhaps it simply cannot afford to expend much beyond 
lofty legislation to protect minority interests. When Germany announced 
its plan to deport non-EU citizen Roma, it encountered virtually none of 
the international backlash France weathered,
100
 suggesting that the 
disapproval of France’s actions depended upon the EU citizen status of the 
minorities in question. 
Although the EU enacted legislation to establish community-wide 
standards, its lack of enforcement predictably results in minority 
alienation.
101
 To remedy this, the EU must first define succinctly whether 
the EU or the member states controls the power to enforce intra-EU 
migration policy. If they share the responsibility, treaties must more 
explicitly delineate the limits of each party’s power. Many members of 
Parliament fear destabilization of the EU through casual enforcement of its 
 
 
 97. On the more discriminatory end of the spectrum, see Murray, supra note 43 (describing 
Romanian policies). In contrast, see Spain’s highly proactive policy for integrating Roma. Spain 
Shows Education Key to Roma Integration, THE DIPLOMAT (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.the 
diplomat.ro/articol.php?id=1489 (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). 
 98. Uzunova, supra note 42, at 304. National governments, particularly local elected authorities, 
“‘are often unwilling to implement measures’ . . . for Roma inclusion, because such programs are 
unpopular with their constituents.” Id. (citations omitted).  
 99. A few months before the Italy fingerprinting conflict, the European Commission “called 
upon member states to use ‘all means possible to improve the inclusion of the Roma people.’” 
Uzunova, supra note 42, at 317 (citing F. VILLARREAL & C. WALEK, EUROPEAN ROMA SUMMIT 
CONFERENCE REPORT 2 (2008)), available at http://www.gitanos.org/upload/63/41/European_Roma_ 
Summit_16092008.pdf. Critics argue, however, that immigration may be the catalyst to the ultimate 
destabilization of the EU. See Baetz, supra note 16 (noting the tension between new Schengen entrants 
Romania and Bulgaria and original members France and Germany over the latter’s perceived power to 
discriminate against the former).  
 100. Germany Contradicts French Statement on Roma Camps, BBC NEWS (Sept. 16, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11338112 (“The issue of Roma deportations from France 
dominated an EU summit.”). For example, the “EU Justice Commissioner, Viviane Reding, had 
appeared to compare France’s actions to persecutions in Nazi-occupied France.” Id. 
 101. Situation of Roma in Europe: EU Parliament Quizzes the Commission, EUROPA (Sept. 30, 
2010), http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_10144_en.htm. The EU Parliament insisted that 
the European Commission “must apply zero tolerance to any failure to transpose the [Directive].” Id.  
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laws. Indeed, some of them consider the Commission to be showing 
“disastrous weakness” in failing to present a competent and firm response 
to the nations potentially violating EU law.
102
 The “elegant middle way” 
of legislation by directive, without substantive Commission support, 
threatens to tarnish the credibility of the Union’s future legislation.103 
While proponents argue that strong national autonomy permits nations to 
serve as “laboratories” for testing versions of EU Parliamentary 
directives,
104
 this experiment can only result in increasingly liberal 
interpretations of EU law that weaken the Union from within. 
Dissention on migration issues is a primary reason original member 
states have begun to vote in favor of more isolationist policies, producing 
the first fracture in the solidarity of the EU. In December 2010, three 
months before Romania, Bulgaria, and Cyprus were due to enter the 
Schengen area, France and Germany pressured the European Union to 
delay their admission.
105
 Though there are many factors that determine 
whether a country should join the EU, the reluctance to admit these new 
states suggests that the original member states may believe the new states 
are ill prepared to protect the original states’ interests through responsible 
immigration and monitoring policies. As a result, the new countries’ 
entrance date into the Schengen area is under review to appease the 
established-state interests.
106
 This discriminatory and indefinite exclusion 
of the new states has effectively created a separate “class” within the EU, 
including countries with only partial rights, in sharp conflict with the EU 
goal of establishing a collaborative community.
107
 
In addition to harming the unity of the EU, soft enforcement of EU law 
stunts both minority integration and new state development. Many 
 
 
 102. Id.  
 103. See Newton, supra note 25 (“Aside from their elegant middle way between Europe-wide 
control and total respect for national sovereignty, [directives] also allow for a measure of 
experimentation among various states in the pursuit of the ‘best’ expression of the norm posited by the 
directive.”). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Justyna Pawlak, Romania and Bulgaria Face Delay in Joining Schengen, REUTERS (Dec. 22, 
2010), http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE6BL10T20101222 (“‘In our opinion it is still 
premature to envisage the entry into the Schengen zone in March 2011,’ the interior ministers of 
France and Germany wrote in a letter . . . to the European Commission . . . .”). Germany and France 
urged the EU to delay admission because the inclusion of the new countries would cause ‘“serious 
consequences for the internal security of the European Union,’” while Romania’s president 
condemned the countries’ concerns as unfair discrimination in violation of EU law. Id. 
 106. See ‘Populism’ Decried as Romania, Bulgaria Barred From Schengen, EURACTIVE (Sept. 
23, 2011), http://www.euractiv.com/justice/populism-decried-romania-bulgaria-barred-schengen-news 
-507867. 
 107. Treaty on European Union, supra note 5. 
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advocates denounce France’s expulsion of migrants as a violation of the 
migrants’ human rights and a form of oppressive discrimination.108 The 
problem will be exacerbated if the EU tacitly permits states to set their 
own immigration policies, as less developed countries that are only newly 
eligible for admission to the EU will bear a larger burden of immigration 
screening because of their location on the perimeter.
109
 Because many EU 
immigrants come from the East,
110
 new EU countries will likely be forced 
to make many more border migration and asylum decisions than before 
their entry into the EU. 
Others skeptical of the EU’s immigration policies argue that the new 
member countries may admit fewer immigrants due to the nations’ lack of 
experience in making high-volume migration decisions, and therefore, the 
established EU nations are using the new border of Eastern European 
nations to limit immigration to the EU.
111
 If France, Italy, and other 
comparatively wealthy European nations have sufficient control of the EU 
to prevent Romania and Bulgaria’s admission to the Schengen area and are 
not formally prohibited from deporting migrants like the Roma to new EU 
nations outside the Schengen area, the poorer European countries will bear 
the burden of integrating minority populations.  
 
 
 108. French MPs Say Yes to Stripping Nationality Law, supra note 58. 
 109. European Union policies consistently shift the burden of migration policy to border states 
that are inherently the newest members of the European Union. See generally De Blouw, supra note 
91 (discussing the EU’s Dublin Regulation in terms of migration concerns). For a discussion of the 
consequences of such a delegation of responsibility in terms of asylum policy and the EU’s steps to 
make asylum a Union-wide responsibility, see Barry Junker, Note, Burden Sharing or Burden 
Shifting? Asylum And Expansion In The European Union, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 293 (2006). Like the 
EU’s attempts at establishing migration policy, EU legislation on asylum policy that calls the 
processing of refugee applications a “Union-wide problem” is “little more than a statement of values 
[with] no bearing on the actual application of EU asylum law.” Id.  
 110. OANA MIHAELA ET AL., MIGRANTS AND BORDERS: ROMANIA AND MOLDOVA, 
EUROBROADMAP 3 (2011), http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/63/82/53/PDF/EWP_migrants_ 
borders_moldova.pdf (“[I]n 2008, Romania was the second [most popular] EU member as regards the 
non-UE immigrants’ rate (86%) [of entrance into the EU], after Slovenia. As a new gate for entering 
the EU space, Romania is expected to become even more attractive for non EU migrants in the 
future.”). 
 111. Shimmel, supra note 50, at 793. Not all authorities agree, however, that European nations 
have become more protectionist in the face of high levels of immigration. See DEMETRIOS G. 
PAPADEMETRIOU ET AL., MIGRATION AND IMMIGRANTS TWO YEARS AFTER THE FINANCIAL 
COLLAPSE: WHERE DO WE STAND?, MIGRATION POLICY INST. 3 (2010), available at http://www.mig 
rationpolicy.org/pubs/MPI-BBCreport-2010.pdf. Though the past several years has seen the rise of 
“pay-to-go” policies, deportations, increased enforcement measures, higher bars for visa eligibility, 
and reduced quotas, “for the most part, policymakers have understood that [protectionist] labor market 
policies designed to protect domestic workers’ jobs will . . . adversely affect their competitiveness. 
Protectionism has not dominated immigration policies, nor have legal foreign residents experienced a 
retrenchment of their rights.” Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The European Commission’s consistent failures in both clarifying the 
meaning of Parliamentary directives and enforcing those directives when 
violations allegedly occur endangers the Union as a whole by 
incentivizing opportunistic disobedience of EU law.
112
 Nations joined the 
EU to “ensure the economic and social progress of their States by common 
action . . . [the] removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted action in 
order to guarantee steady expansion . . . [and] their harmonious 
development by reducing the differences existing between the various 
regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions.”113 Perhaps 
most importantly, the member states joined the Union to “confirm the 
solidarity which binds Europe.”114 It is the duty of their elected leaders to 
address the real problems facing member countries and strive to provide 
workable, non-idealistic solutions so that countries ultimately benefit from 
their membership in the EU.
115
 
Lindsay Smith  
 
 
 112. Because many of the expulsion decisions were allegedly made on a generalized, rather than 
particularized basis, France’s actions appear to facially violate the terms of the Directive. Council 
Directive 2004/38, supra note 14, at 84. The Directive prohibits nations from expelling migrants who 
have stayed past the typically permitted three months if the migrant is employed, a student in the host 
state, has sufficient resources to support himself, or is a family member of someone meeting one of the 
other conditions. Id. at 93–94. France may have also violated the Directive if deportees met the above 
criteria and did not pose rational public threats. Id.  
 113. Treaties, supra note 31, pmbl. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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